Conceptual framework and instructions for country reports
CA23102 - Linking euroscepticism and populism
COST Action working group 1
Word length: maximum 3,000 words excl reference list
Intended publication platform for collection of reports: Open Research Europe (ORE)
Deadline for first draft: 15 June 2025
Process
Authors will submit first drafts of their country reports to the WG1 leadership team, who will review the documents together with the core leadership team, and provide feedback. Authors will then be invited to revise their submission and submit a final draft of their report to the leadership team for approval. The approved version will then be submitted to Open Research Europe, to then undergo formal and independent peer review. This will be handled by the Open Access Europe team. These are the guidelines reviewers will be following to assess suitability for publication in Open Research Europe. Please keep them in mind when writing your report (though the criteria in italics may not be applicable)!
• Is the background of the case’s history and progression described in sufficient detail?
• Is the work clearly and accurately presented and does it cite the current literature?
• If applicable, is the statistical analysis and its interpretation appropriate?
• Are all the source data underlying the results available to ensure full reproducibility?
• Are the conclusions drawn adequately supported by the results?
• Is the case presented with sufficient detail to be useful for teaching or other practitioners?
Conceptual framework
Please read the associated conceptual framework paper for a more elaborate explanation of the key concepts and how they are approached and defined in this project.
Populism: a political discourse centred on an antagonism between ‘people’ and ‘elites’ that expresses support for popular sovereignty versus unresponsive or corrupt elite rule.
Main Subcategories of populist actors
o Populist radical right (PRR): political actors that express populism AND are a) nativist: expressing the idea that members of the native group should be prioritised and that non-native elements are fundamentally threatening b) authoritarian: adhering to the belief in a strictly ordered society with inherent natural inequalities (based on Mudde 2007, with a few tweaks).
o Left-wing populists: political actors that express populism AND ‘reject the underlying socio-economic structure of contemporary capitalism and advocate for alternative economic and power structures. They see economic inequality as the basis of existing political and social arrangements and call for a major redistribution of resources from existing political elites (March 2012)’ (quoted from https://popu-list.org/about/).
o Valence populists: political actors that express populism AND ‘that predominantly, if not exclusively, compete by focusing on nonpositional issues such as the fight against corruption, increased transparency, democratic reform and moral integrity, while emphasizing anti-establishment motives (...) this is not to deny that valence populists may adopt specific positions; however, their policy stances are primarily informed by an unadulterated conception of populism (with other ideological elements, if any, playing a marginal or secondary role), and are therefore flexible, free-floating and, often, inconsistent (Zulianello 2020: 329-332; see also Zulianello and Larsen 2024).
Notes:
o Populism may be expressed regularly and consistently by certain actors. These actors can therefore be classified as ‘populist parties / politicians’. But populism can also be a more fleeting discourse expressed by political actors that cannot genuinely be labelled ‘populist’. The Popu-List database is a useful classification resource to start out from: https://popu-list.org/.
o According to the approach adopted in this project, populism is not considered to be essentially anti-pluralistic (and therefore illiberal), even though the dominant form of populism in Europe (the PRR) is anti-pluralistic given that it merges populism with nativism and authoritarianism.
Euroscepticism: ‘the idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European Integration’ (Taggart 1998: 366). Party positions may differ depending on:
• The object of opposition: parties may oppose different aspects of EU integration. They may oppose the institutional structure of the EU (‘polity’) or specific EU measures (‘policies’). They may also vary in their assessment on the idea of European collaboration (‘principle’), the concrete form this collaboration takes in the EU’s institutions and structures (‘practice’) and its direction (‘future’).
• The intensity and consistency of opposition: parties may vary in how strongly they oppose EU integration. They may oppose it in full (‘hard’ Euroscepticism) or only in part (‘soft’ Euroscepticism). They may also display variation in how consistently they hold these positions (‘ambivalent’ or ‘equivocal’ Euroscepticism).
• The nature of opposition: parties may oppose the EU on different grounds depending on their broader ideological commitments.
Instructions for country reports
Main task: map expressions and mobilisations of (populist forms of) Euroscepticism in the country you analyse, using the definitions and conceptual framework above. The emphasis is on populist (and other) expressions of Euroscepticism and the position that populist actors take on ‘Europe’. That is, the reports should not be about populism and its different ideological forms as such, if there is no clear connection to the question of ‘Europe’. The main focus is on political actors on the ‘supply side’ - political parties in particular - instead of opinion and behaviour of citizens on the political ‘demand side’ (the latter should only be briefly covered in the introduction). If relevant in your case, you may reflect on the role of actors that are part of civil society (e.g. Euroscepticism in social movement organisations), but the main focus should be on political actors in the ‘formal/conventional’ political arena (e.g. parties / politicians represented in parliament).
Note: Except for the introduction, which should provide a broad overview and may trace developments leading up to 2008, the main body of the report (Sections 2–4) should primarily focus on the period since the outbreak of the financial crisis (2008 onwards). This timeframe serves as a guideline rather than a strict requirement, allowing for flexibility in coverage.
The country report should follow this structure, and address the following points:
1) Introduction, including:
• A general sketch of the role of the EU / European integration in national political debates;
• A brief sketch of public attitudes towards European integration.
2) Populist political actors
• Are there political actors that can be deemed consistently ‘populist’ in the country you analyse, e.g. parties of the PRR or left-wing populist parties? Provide a very brief description of their ideology (main issues) and profile.
• Have they worked together with other populist actors (e.g. parties or transnational social movements) in Europe (e.g. through EP parliament group, informal and formal networks)?
3) Positions on ‘Europe’ and the Populism-Euroscepticism nexus
• What is the general position of these populist actors on the issue of European integration? To guide your analysis, consider these points (which can be merged in the analysis, rather than be discussed strictly one-by-one):
o What aspect of European integration (if any) do they oppose: the principle, practice, or future of the EU? Is their critique focused on the shape of the EU, on specific policies, or on both?
o Are they ‘hard’ or ‘soft’ Eurosceptic, or not Eurosceptic at all? Is their position consistent or rather blurry or changeable?
o What reasons do they bring forward to oppose the EU?
o What is their vision of an ideal ‘Europe’?
o Have their positions on ‘Europe’ developed, specifically in response to a) Brexit; b) COVID; c) the war in Ukraine; d) the re-election of Donald Trump? (no need to say much if specific events were of little relevance to their Euroscepticism).
• To what extent and how have these actors framed their positions on Europe (and Euroscepticism) in an explicitly populist fashion (emphasising the antagonism between ‘people’ and ‘elites’)?
• Is there a specific variant of populism (e.g. PRR nativist populism, left-wing populism) that is particularly connected to their Euroscepticism? Are there other expressions of Euroscepticism (by any political actors) that lack an obvious populist character (i.e. without explicit reference to the antagonism between ‘people’ and ‘elites’)?
4) Responses to Euroscepticism and consequences
• How have traditionally pro-EU mainstream parties responded to Eurosceptic discourses? Could their responses be described as ‘dismissive’ (ignore), ‘accommodative’ (engage in competition, take similar stance) or ‘adversarial’ (engage in competition, take opposite stance)? See Meguid (2005) for detailed conceptual framework.
• Are there concrete consequences of populist political actors’ Euroscepticism, or is Euroscepticism of secondary importance among the actors that voice it / do they seem to address the issue in a purely opportunistic fashion?
5) Short conclusion
• Brief summary and reflection on comparative idiosyncrasies of case and/or implications of analysis for broader research area.
References
March, L. (2012) Radical Left Parties in Europe. London: Routledge.
Meguid, B. (2005) ‘Competition Between Unequals: The Role of Mainstream Party Strategy in Niche Party Success’, American Political Science Review. 2005;99(3):347-359.
Mudde, C. (2007) Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Zulianello M. (2020) ‘Varieties of Populist Parties and Party Systems in Europe: From State-of-the-Art to the Application of a Novel Classification Scheme to 66 Parties in 33 Countries’, Government and Opposition, 55(2), 327-347.
Zulianello, M. and Larsen, E. (2024) ‘Blurred positions: The ideological ambiguity of valence populist parties’, Party Politics, 30(1), 190-199.